South Sudan’s election dilemma has no easy way out

By Oyet Patrick Charles

The extended transitional period under the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) is set to expire in February 2027, preceded by planned general elections on December 22, 2026.The situation pushes South Sudan’s government between a rock and a hard place in an existential political paradox.

On one side lies a rock, holding national elections without fulfilling the fundamental prerequisites of the (R-ARCSS). The 2018 peace accord was meant to achieve key reforms such as getting a unified national army, a permanent constitution, a national population census, and an open civic space.

Years of political inertia, delayed funding, and recurring security crises have left the country facing its ultimate deadline for elections with almost none of the required groundwork finished. To push forward with elections on an incomplete foundation is to build a house on sand where losers may reject the results and contest them through violence rather than the courts.

On the other side lies the hard place, extension of the life of the current government and postponing elections leaving in place unelected status quo, which hence deepens public frustration and exhausts the goodwill of the international donors.

The South Sudanese government hitherto relied on collective consensus among all signatory parties to approve extension of the transitional period, as mandated by Article 8.4 of the R-ARCSS. Today, that mechanism is paralyzed. The house arrest of First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar and the resulting factional split within his SPLM-IO party make it virtually impossible to convene all peace signatories at the negotiating table. Consequently, any extension declared without Dr. Machar and his loyalist faction lacks full consensus, leaving it legally vulnerable to challenges as a direct breach of the peace agreement.

Securing a legally recognized extension requires a swift resolution of Dr. Machar’s court case, alongside the full participation of him and or his party in the decision that extends the implementation timeframe for the 2018 peace deal.

The current options leave the government with no choice but to call for polls; failing to extend the transitional period without holding elections would create a total political deadlock. However, holding elections now is an electoral trap of its own making. The government has continued to repeat the same mistakes while expecting a different outcome, demanding that electoral bodies organize a credible vote without providing the funding necessary to carry out their mandate.

The National Election Commission (NEC) has raised two issues, the first, is the lack of funding. NEC says it has only so far received seven (7%) of the funds it needs to organize the elections, so, with just five months left until the polls, will the government provide the remaining 93% of the funding?

If the 93% of the funds is provided, will NEC be able to finalize employment of the needed staff and arrange all logistics required to have the polls in December?

Elections require robust staff and logistical arrangements, in addition to the NEC commissioners, Legal officers, voter education officers who are based at the national level and the High Committees, who are already appointed in the states, (they comprise five members according to the National Election Act, Section 25).

 The following are still needed;

Returning and Assistant Returning officers for each constituency, who are charged with establishing polling centers and stations including the appointment of officers to oversee polls in entire constituencies, they receive candidate nominations, supervise polling operations and decide final constituency results after voting.

Electoral Logistics and Supply Managers, they manage distribution networks for ballots, indelible ink, ICT equipment such as computers and ballot boxes.

Presiding officers and their assistants. (station managers), they are responsible for overall management of a single polling station, ensuring proper procedure, security, and sealing of ballot boxes.

Polling officers/clerks, they handle frontline duties, including checking voter IDs against the names in the registers (rolls), applying indelible ink, issuing ballot papers, and directing voters.

Counting officers/tally clerks,  they verify ballot box seals post-election, count votes, and record official results under party agents’ supervision.

Electoral security officers/police personnel, they are to maintain order at polling stations, secure ballot transport, and guard tally centers.

ICT technicians, they maintain electronic voting machines or computers and transmit result.

Domestic/international observers’ coordinators, the domestic and international observers are there to ensure compliance with electoral standards and coordinate neutral oversight.

All the aforementioned staff will have to be hired before heading to the polls and yet time is running out for the National Election Commission.

There is also need to procure ballot boxes and papers, the papers can only be printed once the candidates for each position are known so that their photos, names, party symbols/signs etc are printed on the papers, but the National Election Commission is yet to begin receiving nominated candidates for the various elective positions, scrutinize whether or not they possess the necessary requirements for the positions they want to contest for and make decisions.

Some of those decisions by NEC may be contested by the candidates and it will require time to listen to them and resolve the issues, this further requires time which NEC is now running out of.

The second electoral challenge cited by NEC is the legal framework surrounding polls in Administrative Areas. For example, while Section 61 of the National Elections Act governs the composition and election of State Legislative Assemblies, it makes no provision for Administrative Areas. Consequently, conducting these polls requires amending the National Election Act to include Administrative Areas.

One can therefore conclude that South Sudan’s election dilemma has no easy way out, it’s up to the political leaders to make a decision not to favor themselves, or their political opponents but the country.

The views expressed in this piece do not reflect the views of any of the institutions for which the writer works.